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Introduction 
As discussed in the introduction, many scholars have argued that public space is 
a prerequisite for the expression, representation, preservation and enhancement of 
democracy (Boudreau, 2000; Caldeira, 2000; Holston and Appadurai, 1999; Low, 
2000; Sassen, 1996; Low and Smith, 2006). This has not been more true than in the 
capital cities of Latin America in recent decades, where political demonstrations 
have played a critical role in the demise of totalitarian regimes and the re­
establishment of democracy. Caracas, capital city of Venezuela, is a prime example 
in that key urban spaces have been sites for popular demonstrations since Hugo 
Chavez became President in 1998. Public buildings such as the seats of political 
and military power, and private ones such as headquarters of media corporations 
functioned as architectural icons and background to these events. 
While much attention has been paid to the role of social, political, and economic 
factors in the development of these events (Ellner and Hellinger, 2004; Marquez 
and Pifiango, 2003; Mendez, 2004; McCaughan, 2004; Santamaria, 2004),1 we 
know less about the influence of the physical and symbolic dimensions of publiC 
'Id' sandspace.2 We argue that the urban location and context of particular bUl U1g 
spaces, their accessibility to different groups from various areas of the city, and 
their relative symbolic value have been critical in the unfolding of political events, 
especially during the coup d'etat and Chavez's subsequent reinstatement. 
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Caracas Scapes: Geographical and Socio-Political Fissures 
Covering 912,050 square kilometres (slightly more than twice the size of 
California), Venezuela has a relatively small population of 25,375,281 people Ouly 
2005 estimates). With the world's sixth largest oil reserves, the national economy is 
heavily dependent on petrochemicals.3 However the proceeds from these resources 
have not trickled down, leaving 49.4 per cent of the population poor, 21.7 per cent 
indigent, and 71.1 per cent living below the poverty line (UN /CEPAL, 2001, p. 57), 
with all estimates showing a dramatic increase in poverty between 1975 and 1995. 
According to an income-based poverty measure (Riutort, 1999),33 per cent lived 
in poverty in 1975 and 70 per cent in 1995. If poverty more than doubled in that 
period, the number of households in extreme poverty increased three-fold, from 
about 15 to 45 per cent. Though other non-income-based measures show slightly 
lower figures, Venezuela registered the largest increase in poverty and has the 
largest proportion of the population living in poverty in Latin America (Wilpert, 
2003b). 
It is no surprise that this notable inequality animates contemporary political 
struggle. 1n the country's main cities, such as Caracas, poverty is reflected in 
squatter settlements (popularly called barrios), accommodating over 40 per cent of 
the population.4 Approximately 1,000 metres above sea level, Caracas's 5.1 million 
people (2004),5 inhabit a dense narrow valley bordered by mountains at a density 
of 1,011.59 people per km2 in a metropolitan area of 2,050 km2 Many of the poor 
barrios are on steep hills, particularly in Petare in the east (also home to the middle 
and upper class) and Catia and La Vega in the west (mainly a working- and lower­
middle class area) . Barrios are sprung along river courses, out of sight until the 
occasional floods wreak havoc. 
Right in the middle of the city are the curvaceous 'garden-suburbs' of the 
Caracas Country Club. In the east, high-density blocks of upper-middle-class 
apartments are spaced on regular streets or climb precariously up the hillsides. 
To the west, large public housing projects stand out, including the massive Le 
Corbusier-inspired '23rd of January' estate.6 In various parts of the city, lower­
middle-class apartment buildings crowd the narrow streets of the traditional 
settlements. On the hills, or snuggled next to exclusive villas of the wealthy in 
the east, are the intricate, maze-like streets, paths, and stairways of the barrios. 
The main bustling commercial and industrial core linearly traces the spine of the 
valley. The hodgepodge of uses and styles of architecture is visually united by the 
AVila rising another 1,000 metres to the north, as well as by the tropical vegetation 
spro h_U".llg out of any spare space. 
Administratively and politically, Caracas is a fragmented city. The capital strides 
two large, politically independent entities, Miranda State and Capital District. 
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The Capital District, seat of national government, has only one municipality -
Libertador, whereas four municipalities - Chacao, Sucre, Baruta, and EI Hatillo are 
in Miranda state.7 Additionally, a metropolitan level of government was created 
in 2000 to coordinate the activities of the five municipalities. Approximately 65 
per cent of the city's population is in Libertador and 23 per cent in Sucre, leaving 
only 12 per cent in other three. Most barrios are located in Libertador (65 of the 
barrio population) and Sucre, the two largest municipalities. Until 2004, these 
two municipalities had mayors loyal to the national government, whereas Baruta, 
Chacao and EI Hatillo had mayors opposing it. Similarly, the Metropolitan Mayor 
until 2004, Alfredo Pena, was an active opponent of the national government, 
although he was elected with its support. In the 2004 elections, however, support 
for Chavez's administration increased with the election of Juan Barreto as 
Metropolitan Mayor. 
These rifts were exacerbated by the neo-liberal economic policies implemented 
by Venezuela's government throughout the 1980s. Together with political 
corruption and mismanagement, they greatly reduced the standard of living. 
The marked reduction in government spending was especially detrimental to 
the poor, as per capita spending was reduced by 40 per cent between 1980 and 
1993. Education spending was slashed by more than 40 per cent, housing and 
urban development projects by 70 per cent, and health services by 37 per cent. 
As a result, between 1984 and 1995, the poor doubled to 66 per cent of the total 
population with those in exh'eme poverty rising from 11 per cent to 36 per cent 
(Roberts, 2004). In 1982, 60 per cent of the population could count themselves as 
part of Venezuela's privileged middle-class, but by 1990, only 34 per cent could 
(Marquez and Pifi.ango, 2003). The economy continued to deteriorate throughout 
the 1993-2003 period (Garcia-Guadilla et aI., 2004, p. 10).6 The following sequences 
of maps present a socio-economic and socio-spatial analysis of the metropolitan 
area with data from 19989 Predictably, these factors are fairly correlated with the 
population's political preferences (shown in figure 7.5). This mapping helps us 
understand the uses and meanings of public spaces in the dynamic reformulations 
of democracy and citizenship in the city. 
Figure 7.1 shows the five municipalities that compose the metropoliS. 
Representing population, the map shows that in effect, the two most populoUS 
municipalities are Libertador and Sucre, governed by mayors who support 
Chavez. Complementary, figure 7.2 shows the density in Caracas. Again, the 
densest areas are in the east and west of the metropolis, coinciding with the 
greatest concentrations of popular, mostly self-built barrios and low to middle-loW 
income areas. It is important to notice that Miraflores, the Presidential Palace where 
Chavez resides, is located in the dense district of Libertador. Figure 7.3 clearly 
shows that there is no direct correlation between land values and accessibility to 
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Figure 7.1. Municipalities and population in Caracas. The two most populous municipalities 










Figure 7.2. Density in Caracas. The densest areas are in the east and west of the metropolis, 
where squatter settlements and low to middle-low income housing areas are. The Presidential 
Palace where Chavez resides is located in the dense area of Libertador. Drawn by Josefina 
Florez and Nelliana Viloria in 2000 with 1998 data. 
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Figure 7.3 . Relation be tween land values and accessibility to the centre of Caracas. Accessibility 
to the centre where the government institutions are located is measured in minutes of travel 
hme. Elaborated by Josefina Florez and Nelliana Viloria in 2000 with 1998 data. 
the centre of the city, where Miraflores and many of the government institutions 
are located lO The areas with highest land values are those with the lowest density 
and largest income, and correspond to formal urbanization. Alternatively, the 
~reas with lowest land values have the highest density and lowest household 
income and mostly reflect informal urbanization. Figure 7.4 shows the distribution 
of yearly income per household. We can detect income polarization: most 
hOUseh ld . o s m Libertador and Sucre have incomes up to US $6,300 per year as 









Figure 7.4. Distribution of yearly income per household in Caracas. The map shows the 
income polarization that exists in the metropolis. Elaborated by Josefina Florez and Nelliana 
Viloria in 2000 with 1998 data. 
of 1998, while households in Chacao, Baruta, and EI Hatillo have incomes higher 
than $23,800 (except the barrios within Baruta where income is $12,300). 
Figure 7.5 shows electoral results for Caracas of the 2004 referendum to end 
Chavez's presidency. The districts with largest population density and size and 
the lowest income and lowest land values voted to keep Chavez president. This 
geographical political distribution thus correlated with socio-economic, political­
administrative and spatial factors and has had implications for the use of public 
space for political demonstrations, especially during April 2002, as discussed in 
the next section. 
",t.Esta usted de acuerdo con dejar sin etecto el 
MJnieipio Ubertador ~.!3!t.l..mandato popular, otorgado mediante elecciones 1. 23 d.! En~ro 24.8 c.w.1
democreticas legftimas 01 ciudadano Hugo 2. ~~ra.:ja 13. SZl JU3t'l 
Ra1ael Chavez Frias, como presidente de Is 3, San ..bsti= 14. La P3:n0t3 ~: ~r:~es~~dtl fbslrio dt 9PAU 
Rep,jblict't Bolivariana de Venezuela para el 4 . SIn 81!mardil'1O 15.~(;~ 
actu~1 periodo presictenciel?" 6. C3tedr.J1 I~. 8 JUl"lqUto M.mi¢ipjo EI Hitjl~ 
6. Dlnde.I:oari3 17. .4':t.i~n~ 27. e HitiPo 
7. San1aT~resa 18. ~\kga 
8 . San tlQ.JS1in 19.811>11. MJnl¢ipio Sucre 
0. 8 ?,eCNO 20. Coche 2$: . Leorcio MtttinerReferendo1.dwg 
10 . $.3n Poedro 21. O'ps;-~.\' 2Q . Petare 
1L SartQ Fbsar.a 22. t.m.t 'lp!~ lO . La D>lorita"	 NO 12 . 8 ParalSll) 31. ~.vx:Y'..!Sl 
MJnjc.:jp&o0'-~. 32. Flbsde~CJ 81 2~. Q~~,<:l',? 
U· Vloria 2()04·Figure 7.5. The 2004 recall referendum results for Caracas. Elaborated by Ne lana 1 , 
Space, Revolution and Resistance: Ordinary Places and Extraordinary Events in Caracas 149 
Chronology of Political Events in Public Space 
This section analyses the political and spatial dimensions of the events prior to 
and during the April 2002 coup d'etat that forced President Chavez out of office for 
43 hours. Significantly, people from many of the sectors that support Chavez in the 
west of the metropolis - as evidenced in the recent referendum (and in previous 
and subsequent elections) - have better accessibility to the city centre than people 
in the sectors that voted against him (figure 7.3), It is important to note, however, 
that Chavez supporters also hail from other sectors of the city (e.g. Petare, El Valle, 
and Caricuao) that do not have similar accessibility. Also not all barrios, although 
close, have 'good' accessibility. In other words, although accessibility definitely 
helped, even more important was the people's determination to restore Chavez 
to the presidency. This allowed significant numbers to be present arOlmd the 
Presidential Palace for the days leading up to the coup on 11 April 2002. After 
Chavez was abducted, supporters of the Chavez government quickly organized 
and by the next evening had congregated in large groups around the Palace and 
the Tiuna military fort. This presence and the support of a sector of the military 
which remained loyal to Chavez derailed the coup. 
Precedents 
In describing the political process that led to the April 2002 events, we adopt 
the national government's denomination of two distinct periods in recent 
Venezuelan history: the IV Republic for the period beginning with the fall of 
the last dictatorship in Venezuela in 1958 until 1998-1999, and the V Republic 
for the period following the election of President Hugo Chavez in 1998 and the 
subsequent promulgation of a new national constitution in 1999. 11 In each phase, 
the socia-political construction and use of space have been factors in the definition 
of the political process. 
IV RepUblic. From the overthrow of the last dictator, Marcos Perez Jimenez, in 1958 
until the election of Chavez as president in 1998, Venezuelans elected presidents 
every five years, usually from the Social Democratic AD (Acci6n Democratica) or 
the Social Christian COPEl (Comite de Organizaci6n Politica Electoral Independiente) 
parties. Public events during the campaigns and those for Labour Day and the 
yearly celebrations of party anniversaries were mostly orchestrated and left little 
room. for spontaneous political demonstrations . The last were mainly restricted to 
~~dent protests, sometimes supported by some faculty and other university or 
19h school staff and members of smaller political parties. 
Protests followed a repetitive pattern, often starting peacefully and joyously, 
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but ending in violent confrontations with the police and sometimes injury 
and death, In this period, the sites of struggle were mainly restricted to spaces 
around public high schools (liceos), colleges, and universities, The principal public 
meetings were limited to the main plazas in the traditional centre of Caracas 
- Plazas O'Leary and Venezuela - or Bolivar Avenue (closed to traffic for the 
events). Regular protests in 'hot spots' (such as the Plazas Venezuela and Las Tres 
Gracias, both adjacent to the Central University of Venezuela; and Jose Antonio 
Paez Avenue in front of the Pedagogic University) and the resulting traffic jams 
became predictable rituals. Probably due to the economic crisis, they subsided 
during the 1980s as less funds were available and because of the deterioration in 
public safety and disenchantment with traditional political parties. 
The EI Caracazo or Santd6n of 1989, a social reaction against the neo-liberal 
policies introduced by the penultimate president of the IV Republic, Carlos Andres 
Perez, and in particular to the increase in public transport tariffs, signalled a break 
with established rituals, On 27 February, the poor blocked principal avenues and 
freeways and paralysed the city, The middle- and upper-income classes reacted 
with fear as their ever-present nightmare seemed to come true - Le., the poor 
descending from their barrios on the hills and taking over the city. Expressing 
frustration, disenfranchised Caraquenos stormed and looted commercial centres 
and small businesses in a seemingly unorganized and anarchic form. In a brutal 
clampdown the police and the military killed an unknown number of people - a 
conservative estimate is 400, but other unofficial es'timates place the number at 
3,000,12 Curfews and blockades lasted almost a week and represented a rapidly 
escalating crisis of representative democracy in the country. After El Caracazo, the 
challenges to the political establishment became more frequent and prominent. 
Street protests increased dramatically in Caracas, although some years were more 
turbulent than others. Subsequently, the perception of Venezuelan social history, 
as Lopez Maya and Lander explain, changed: 
In the early I980s, Venezuelans were thought of as being one of the least politically 
mobilized people of Latin America, It was argued that its solid democracy, oiled by the 
oil rent of the State, had allowed it to establish and to consolidate channels of efficient 
mediation and representation that kept pronounced social and/or violent conflict at bay... 
This has been contradicted in the last two decades and has forced the re-examination of 
'street politics' in Venezuela. (Lopez-Maya and Lander, 2004, p. I, authors' translation) 
The political discontent of the 1980s and 1990s resulted from an acute 
economic crisis with increasing poverty and socio-economic polarization, rampant 
corruption, loss of political party legitimacy, lack of accountability and justice, and 
growing national debt. In addition, another element that sparked off the challenge 
to the political establishment after El Caracazo was the discontent of middle-level 
officers who felt frustrated with the country's political leaders and repugnance 
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at having to take up arms against citizens during the riots, all culminating in 
two unsuccessful coups d'etat against the government of Carlos Andres Perez 
in February and November 1992. The former was led by Colonel Hugo Chavez 
accompanied by other military leaders. From this moment on, a new political 
movement which had been secretly gestating as a reaction to the political crisis 
in the country became visible and gathered momentum. In addition, those 
organizations and movements which were excluded from the Pact of Punto Fijo13 
came together, despite class differences, to achieve the goal of 'democratizing 
democracy' (Garcia-Guadilla et aI., 2004, p . 11). For many Venezuelans, this 
movement represented an alternative political project that offered greater hope 
for reform. Finally Perez was impeached and Rafael Caldera was subsequently 
elected president in 1993. Falling international oil prices did not help Caldera, and 
his term was characterized by political instability and general dissatisfaction with 
the government. Many felt that he betrayed his constituency when he turned to 
the International Monetary Fund for aid (Ibid .), all of which provoked passionate 
street demonstrations demanding accountability and justice. 
V Republic. The alternative political model, represented by the political parties 
identified with the project led by Chavez, garnered ample popular support and in 
1998 won the national election with 56 per cent of the vote , Chavez assumed the 
presidency of the country, soon renamed by popular vote Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela . His presidency represented an interruption in the domination of AD 
and COPEl. The approval of a new Constitution in 1999 with 70 per cent of the 
vote gave definition to the 'peaceful revolution', as government labelled it. Shortly 
afterwards, new presidential elections were held and Chavez was re-elected for 
six years with possibility of re-election, as established by the new Constitution. 
The constitutional reform established a participatory democracy with popular 
involvement in government deciSion-making, the valorization of human rights, 
and the recognition of the multiculturalism of Venezuela. 
In addition, the regime emphasizes Latin American integration and openly 
questions neo-liberal principles and conditions imposed by world financial 
bodies . Taxes, import duties, and licenses were reinvigorated, the oil industry 
Was renationalized and its management revamped. 14 Land reform (to legalize 
the occupation of some urban and rural properties and redistribute others), and 
fishing rights (to control drag-net fishing) ensued. It is generally accepted that 
this Was proof that the Chavez government would encourage substantial reform, 
if not revolution, alienating in the process sectors of the middle- and upper­
income classes. A particularly thorny issue was land reform which lead to the first 
bUSiness shut-down in December 2001 (Wilpert, 2003a).15 
As a result of constitutional change and its implementation, some vested 
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interests in the church, traditional political parties, the military, the judicial system, 
the government bureaucracy, state and private companies, academia, the arts, and 
the media have been challenged. 'In countries besieged by extreme inequalities', 
Garcfa-Guadilla et al. (2004, p. 20) explain, 'class cleavages create deep divisions 
making universal proposals difficult to articulate'. Not surprisingly, a strong and 
vociferous opposition emerged, albeit one that is internally fragmented but with 
access to substantial economic resources and which dominates the mass media. 
Initially this appeared as a vigorous democratic opposition, but on 11 April 2002, 
anti-government forces manoeuvred into a position from which a coup d'etat was 
fomented. 
The Events ofApril 2002 
By April 2002, demonstrations and marches gained intensity as Chavez and leaders 
of the opposition encouraged their followers to take to the streets. Each group 
sought to demonstrate that it could garner ever greater numbers of participants 
in different plazas and avenues of the city generating constant controversy over 
the exact numbers involved. The geography of congregation reflected the lines 
of class, race, and political affiliation, all of which were highly correlated. Some 
spaces were even renamed (e.g., Plaza Francia became Plaza de la Libertad (Liberty 
Plaza)), and exclusively appropriated and guarded by certain groups. These 
reterritorializations increased existing social and political cleavages. 
On 11 April 2002, the opposition marched against Chavez's government (figure 
7.6). From a nondescript space in front of a building of the PDVSA (the state oil 
company) in Chuao renamed by the opposition group as Meritocracy Plaza}6 the 
march proceeded peacefully along the Francisco Fajardo Freeway. Although the 
legally permitted route was entirely within the Chacao and Baruta municipalities, 
some leaders of the opposition persuaded the marchers to cross into Libertador 
towards the Presidential Palace. As the march reached the boundary of Libertador, 
a group of entrepreneurs and high-ranking officers planned a coup d'etat which was 
supported by representatives of important civic organizations. They attempted 
to legitimize their sedition by the sheer number of marchers as they resorted to 
unconstitutional, violent means to depose the president (Garcfa-Guadilla et al., 
2004). 
The political climate in the country had been very tense for months, and 
credible rumours about the possibility of a coup attempt had surfaced. Therefore, 
enthusiastic government supporters had surrounded the Presidential Palace 
for days in a pre-emptive move. When the opposition march reached the area 
near the Palace on 11 April, security forces managed to keep government and 
opposition supporters apart, but as a result of what appeared to be sniper gunfire 
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Figure 7.6. March of government opposition, around Carlota Airport on the Francisco Fajardo 
freeway in the Altamira neighbourhood, 2002. 
near the Presidential Palace nearly twenty people were killed (among them eleven 
pro-government demonstrators) and many others were injured in a span of two 
hours. I? 
In the midst of the confrontation, a military force which supported the 
opposition took over the Presidential Palace, and sequestered Chavez. The 
opposition then claimed that President Chavez had resigned. From the 'political 
vacuum' an interim government was formed with representatives from the 
National Business Association (Fedecamaras), the military, and labour unions 
(CTV) through a previously dominant political party (Acci6n Democratica). Pedro 
Carmona Estanga, president of Fedecamaras, proclaimed himself President and 
in his first TV appearance declared the 1999 Constitution void, dissolved the 
democratically elected National Assembly, removed 'Bolivarian' from the name of 
the country, repealed the economic decrees instituted by the Chavez government, 
and dismissed elected state governors and mayors. 
In sum, the new president rejected all the new democratic institutions that had resulted 
from decentralization and that were legitimated through the constituent process and 
institutionalized in the Constitution of 1999. (Garda-Guadilla et al., 2004, p. 19) 
Even some opposition supporters felt that Carmona had gone too far too soon and 
were puzzled or shocked by the authoritarian nature of the coup. 
Almost all commercial media - TV, press and radio - deliberately distorted 
information in order to discredit the government and rally the opposition (Kaiser, 
2003).18 Government sponsored TV and radio stations were forcibly shut down 
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by coup supporters. Commercial television stations coordinated a broadcast of 
government supporters shooting from a bridge giving the impression that they 
were massacring opposition marchers and President Chavez was falsely held 
responsible for the assassinations. During the two days of the coup, government 
sympathizers had to depend on personal and telephone contacts only (even the 
cell phone service was interrupted).19 
Infuriated Chavez supporters took to the streets in impressive numbers (figure 
7.7). The scale of the popular reaction to the coup was totally unexpected 20 During 
the following two days and in an unprecedented event in Latin America a deposed 
president was returned to power after popular pressure and a military faction 
reversed the coup. According to CNN, approximately three million people took to 
the streets of Caracas, and more in other parts of the country, demanding Chavez's 
return to power. Initially these popular uprisings were repressed violently, but 
their scale made further repression impractical. 21 In effect, a multitude surrounded 
the Presidential Palace, encouraged by its reoccupation by the presidential guard 
who had stayed loyal to Chavez. The ministers and military officials identified 
with the ephemeral Carmona junta were left to flee through the tunnels of the 
palace. The crowd outside demanded the rescue of Chavez, and acclaimed him 
when he returned to Miraflores. Another large group also cordoned off the Tiuna 
military fort, where false rumours claimed the president was held hostage, and 
thousands protested and rioted in the streets in several areas of the city. 
Figure 7.7. March of government supporters in Bolivar Avenue, 2002. 
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During the coup, the new junta instigated and/or condoned violent 
repression, arrested members of the Chavista government and leaders of popular 
organizations, humiliated them publicly, and even murdered some. More than 
twenty more people were assassinated in the following days.22 A large group 
attacked the Cuban Embassy23 while the municipal police of Baruta, where the 
embassy is located, stood by. In fact, the mayor of Baruta,24 a Chavez opponent, 
was involved in the attack on the Embassy. The sites of the presidential Palace 
and the Tiuna Fort, pivotal to restoring Chavez, were in territaria Chavista - parts 
of the metropolis where Chavez's supporters represented a large majority. Figure 
7.5 shows both locations of the Palace (Parroquia 2, Altagracia) and the Fort 
(Parroquia 19, El Valle) within or near Chavez strongholds. In addition, figure 7.3 
also shows that accessibility to these places was greater for Chavistas. These were 
important spatial factors that favoured Chavez's return to the presidency. 
The Aftermath of April 2002 
The 2002 coup was a wake up call for government supporters not to underestimate 
the opposition and its tactics. It was a period of great unease but certainly one 
where government supporters received the 'whip lash of the opposition' (a 
frequent quote of Chavez from Trotsky), motivating the consolidation of their 
organizations and group solidarity. After the coup, 'the existential struggle became 
the primary means of expressing difference' (Garda-GuadilJa et ai., 2004, p. 20). 
In this existential struggle, the factions in conflict ceased to abide by the rule of 
law and acted as if survival depended on crushing the other. In such a struggle 
between the state and a fraction of civil society, as Garda-Guadilla explains, 
the role of regulating or mediating conflict assigned to the State proves difficult to execute. 
Moreover, when a part of Civil Society does not recognize the legitimacy of the State as 
mediator and regulator of conflict, this role can no longer be successfully assumed by the 
State. (Ibid., p. 20) 
Intractable conflict ensued. Although the coup of April 2002 failed and many in 
the opposition felt frustrated by it, the opposition movement gained momentum 
and some of their leaders felt empowered. They had destabilized the regime and 
flexed their muscles. Although both the government and the opposition paid lip 
service to the need for dialogue, conflicts rapidly re-escalated posing a continuous 
threat to democracy: 
[C)onflict does threaten the political system when it is 'antagonistic' (as happens in 
Venezuela) because society is not able to define its common collective interest nor is it 
able to contribute to the general will. Worse yet. when civil society and the State cannot 
agree upon the definition of the general will because they have antagonistic ideological 
frameworks (as also happens in Venezuela), then social actors or civil society become 
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politicized and attempt to make their particular interests synonymous with the general 
will. (Ibid.) 
The opposition tried new strategies - a national stoppage, and later, the ousting 
of Chavez by a constitutionally-sanctioned referendum - but to no avail. Again, 
the clash of purposes was forcefully taken to the streets. The central part of the city, 
where most government institutions are located, has a more traditional, pedestrian­
friendly urban grid with many plazas and a few wide and long avenues. In 
contrast, the formally built housing areas in the western part of the city, where the 
opposition is a majority, is a much more modem expansion of the city crisscrossed 
by freeways, with fewer plazas, and a more irregular, less pedestrian-friendly grid. 
Arguably, this spatial advantage facilitated the congregation of Chavistas. One 
of the few sites that the two groups shared during the aftermath of April 2002 
was the Avenida Bolivar. This avenue had traditionally been the thermometer of 
political preferences, measured in popular attendance of political meetings during 
electoral periods during the IV Republic. In this tradition, Chavistas and anti­
Chavistas held rallies in the avenue. This, however, posed a greater challenge to 
the opposition because of the central-eastern location of this avenue, in the midst 
of an ever more strongly-defined 'Chavista territory', leading to reduced use by 
the opposition. 
The opposition used other spatial venues, however. Frequently, they 
congregated on a freeway node near the military airport of La Carlota. They 
also held meetings at the PDVSA headquarters. Perhaps the most popular and 
symbolically powerful site for the opposition was Plaza Altamira or Plaza Francia, 
renamed Plaza de La Libertad, in Chacao, one of the few large plazas in west 
Caracas (figure 7.8). It was built as part of a modernist expansion of the city 
following French aesthetics in a then suburban subdivision designed with garden­
city principles. Today, it is at the heart of the 'anti-Chavista territory' in the city, 
and as such was consequently appropriated by opponent groups for all sorts of 
cultural, political, military, and religious events. Towards the end of October 2002, 
the plaza was declared 'liberated territory' by military officers and representatives 
of civil society. People congregated day and night, for months, to hear speakers and 
participate in acts exhorting resistance. Since Chacao MW1icipality had a mayor 
openly supportive of overthrowing Chavez, the local authorities, including the 
local police force, defended the demonstrators despite their probable transgression 
of local ordinances. 
This occupation of Plaza Altamira was short lived. In a violent incident, 
three deaths blamed on a mentally impaired person scared the crowds from 
frequenting the Plaza, and fatigue set in after many months without perceived 
political progress. Neighbours got tired of the noise and litter and even the local 
mayor, a supporter, at some point wanted to reclaim the plaza to decorate it for 
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Figure 7.B. Plaza Altamira, taken over and renamed Liberty Plaza by the opposition, 2002. 
Christmas and return it to the residents. After a Chavista march led by the then 
Vice-President Jose Vicente Rangel, the plaza was finally 'reconquered'.25 
Throughout the crisis and the concomitant dispute over territory, both 
groups resorted to symbolic warfare, appropriating nationalist and religious 
symbols, Chavez and his followers adopted the colour red for berets and T­
shirts, symbolizing the leftist 'revolution'. The opposition, on the other hand, 
used yellow, symbolizing light and hope for a future without Chavez; or black, 
in sign of mourning. For some, the symbolic use of black alternatively created 
links, purposely or not, to European fascist movements. Black could also be 
interpreted as indicative of the diversity of ideological positions in the opposition 
and also as symbolic of a reactive, rather than an assertive, movement. Massive 
marches of Chavistas have been called fa marea raja (the red tide), and those of 
Opponents, el gusana de fuz (the light worm). In a country with a Catholic majority, 
Chavez speaks often of Christ as leading his revolution; whereas the opposition 
invokes the Virgin Mary to get rid of Chavez. Chavez refers intensely to the new 
Constitution and shows it in many public appearances. The opposition, having 
voted against it and lost, later invoked it too, for the purpose of legitimizing the 
recall referendum. Lastly, Simon Bolivar, historical father of the Republic, after 
being admired by all Venezuelans, has recently turned into a symbol of division: 
Chavistas venerate him and hold him as the main inspiration of their 'Bolivarian 
Revolution', while anti-Chavistas are torn about what they see as an unwelcome 
reVision of national history (Gonzalez Deluca, 2005; Romero, 2005; Suazo, 2005). 
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The National Strike of Late 2002 and Early 2003 
The polarization continued after the coup, fuelling social imaginaries that 
constructed the 'other' as enemy (Lozada, 2004; Salas, 2004). PDVSA, Fedecamaras, 
and the Central Labor Union formed an opposition coalition and planned for a 
general national strike and oil company stoppage to weaken the government 
and force Chavez's resignation. Garcfa-Guadilla et al. (2004, p. 20) describes the 
conditions as follows: 
The 2002 coup d'etat did not put an end to the exclusion of the 'other' from the normative 
models proposed by each faction. The General Strike of December 2002 that lasted 
until February of 2003 carried out by the opposition in defiance to the government is 
another example of the use of the existential struggle as a means of articulating difference. 
The main objective of the general strike, called 'Paro Civico' [Civic Stoppage] by the 
opposition, was to force President Chavez to resign by disrupting the national oil industry. 
This general strike was called by the Coordinadora Democratica, an entity that represented 
the alliances established between political parties and social and economic organizations 
belonging to the opposition. Civil organizations in the opposition supported the strike 
despite the fact the government did not recognize it as legal and even threatened to 
fire those public employees participating in it. The threat materialized when more than · 
5,000 professionals working in the State owned Oil Company, Petroleos de Venezuela 
(PDVSA), and its research institute INTEVEp, were fired. During the two months that the 
'Paro Civico' lasted, there were numerous street mobilizations and violent confrontations. 
The social imaginaries of the opposition and the government fueled the conflict. The 
government labeled citizens participating in the strike as the 'enemy ', the 'traitors', and 
the 'anti-patriotic'. The strike was declared 'illegal'. The opposition, however, described 
the strike as a 'Paro Civico' and justified their actions appealing to Article 350 of the 
Constitution that legitimizes Civil Disobedience. The 'illegal strike' or 'Paro Civico' was 
de-activated only after it proved to be unsuccessful. 
Many in the managerial and professional classes joined the strike, while owners 
of medium and small enterprises and blue-collar workers chose not to . As a result, 
the strike was unevenly adhered to in the city. Many sectors in the east closed 
their businesses as streets emptied out, while most sectors in the west, and poorer 
barrios elsewhere remained bustling with people and activity. Wealthier businesses 
were more likely to oppose Chavez's regime and could absorb the cost of a strike. 
Most small businesses, even if they were not Chavez supporters, could not absorb 
those costs . At PDVSA, managers for the most part complied with the strike, 
while many blue-collar workers did not and by defying their bosses recovered the 
company for the government. Many analysts also referred to the strike as a media 
event, because of the media's skewed depiction of the activities in different spaces 
of the city during the strike (Kaiser, 2003). 26 
The business-owner strike of 2002-2003 and the stoppage of the oil company 
resulted in an undersupply of gas, a collapse of transportation, and deficits in the 
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supply of food and other goods. Those most hurt could not afford to hoard large 
quantities of food nor had space. to store them. The middle class was also affected, 
because of its consumption of products and services imported or denominated in 
dollars (Wilpert, 2003a, p. 106). Securing gasoline or gas became a daily concern. 
In the barrios, people formed queues each time gas cylinders (used for cooking) 
were promised. Wherever lines formed, the surrounding spaces were converted, 
temporarily, into locations for further political discussion. People also created 
elements of self-ordering - controlling the lines, sharing knowledge regarding the 
locations where gas or gasoline were available, and securing some distributional 
justice. 
Those supporting the government occupied key spaces such as the PDVSA 
headquarters in La Campina (in Libertador municipality) in a relatively hostile 
area around the fortress-like headquaters 27 Those supporting the stoppage camped 
in the previously mentioned Meritocracy Plaza in Chuao. The experience of the 
entrepreneurs' stoppage generated a government reaction and reorganization. 
Urgent action was needed on the part of the government to avoid risks to the 
supply of fuel and food. The government's provision of basic subsistence to 
lower-income classes (the Mercal mission) was strategic in its effects, and it also 
was maintained and reproduced after the strike as a way of pre-empting or co­
opting events by the opposition (e.g., major open market events held at the time of 
opposition marches). 
The Opposition Resorts to Violence: the Guarimba 
On 27 February 2004, the fifteenth anniversary of El Caracazo, the opposition 
marched to recall President Chavez. In Caracas, a meeting of the leaders of 
unaligned countries (the GIS group) was being held in the Teresa Carreno 
Theater. For security reasons, the march was refused permission to proceed down 
Libertador Avenue (the theatre is at the end of the avenue), and violent clashes 
with the National Guard ensued . In protest, some members of the middle-class 
went on a three-day rampage, the guarimba, sequestering substantial areas in 
the east of the city. Guarimba acts continued between February and March 2004 
in Caracas and some other Venezuelan cities. The aim was violent disruption 
of public order to provoke repressive military intervention, delegitimize the 
government, and provoke international action. Conceived by Robert Alonso, 
a member of the rightist group Bloque Democrritico, the goal was to create an 
anarchy that would paralyse the country. In its extreme forms, guarimba tactics 
included burning car tyres and ·rubbish in public streets, and using homemade 
explosives like Molotov cocktails and conventional arms. In effect, the media 
activated a 'mediatic guarimba' (according to writer Earle Herrera) by questioning 
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the legitimacy of public authorities and generating a general ambiance of terror. 
Fortunately, the call for massive participation in the guarimbas failed. Both support 
for Chavez and the democratic leanings of Venezuelans, including many from the 
opposition, doomed it (Garda Danglades, 2004). The guarimbas were lifted because 
they were also extremely unpopular as they hampered free movement and littered 
neighbourhoods (Garda-Guadilla, 2005). 
The Referendum in August 2004 
In contrast to the antidemocratic coup attempt and the illegal strike, the 
opposition also made use of the democratic strategy of the recall election, which 
came as a result of street and political mobilizations in 2003 and 2004.28 Not since 
1998 had the opposition displayed greater democratic strength and organizational 
potential, which convinced many of the inevitability of victory. The social and 
spatial segregation of opposition forces reinforced this impression. If everybody 
they knew, talked to, and encountered in their daily lives shared their political 
antagonism toward the government, how could they have conceived of not 
winning the recall? The media openly opposed to Chavez also played a big role 
in reasserting these perceptions in their biased portrayal of public demonstrations, 
marches, and exit polls. Government supporters, similarly, rejected the 
conventional mass media and came to depend on the State TV and radio stations 
as well as a limited number of alternative publications. 
Thus, the participation in extraordinary events in public spaces in Caracas 
and the treatment of those events by the media had a determining role in the 
creation of the disparate imagined communities that Venezuelans of different 
political allegiances constructed as idealizations of their city and nation. The 
media construction of the opposition's powers was not reflected in the subsequent 
recall election results which, as depicted in figure 7.5, reconfirmed Chavez in 
power (with 59 per cent of the votes) and restated the geopolitical segregation of 
the city. The legitimacy of the elections was confirmed by international observers, 
including the Organization of American States (OAS) and Cmtro Carter led by 
United States ex-president Carter. However, many members of the opposition, in 
part motivated by some of their political leaders, and influenced by their media­
constructed visions, did not recognize what they claimed were fraudulent electoral 
results. Their reactions were felt in the streets soon after. 
Discussion of Socio-Spatial Dynamics 
In the tensions between the creation and contestation of new political projects, 
'imagined communities' are redefined, as are new subjectivities of solidarity 
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and belonging. The effect for public space is an unsettling of the traditional 
meanings of place. Post-traditional revisions of pre-established national history 
are performed through the validation and weaving in of subaltern stories. Also, 
the current socio-political condition in Venezuela presents an ever more salient 
post-glocal dimension, as the global and the local embed in each other in myriad 
and fluid ways. Today, Venezuela is a main point of reference for comparative case 
studies conducted by international analysts and scholars. Activists and agencies 
from around the world participate in Venezuelan politics and in the local politics 
of public space, many of whom participate in the local marches. In 2006, the World 
Social Forum was held in Caracas and the Venezuelan president travelled around 
the world promoting his Bolivarian message and lobbying for Latin American 
supranational cooperation treaties. Political tourism to the country is growing. 
One profoundly liberating transformation has been the way many people, who 
previously had a hard time barely 'making life' in the country, have now become 
effective subjects capable of 'making history' (Flacks, 1988). Thus, perhaps to a 
scale similar only to that in Cuba, the current process in Venezuela stands out with 
respect to other case studies in this book in that it reveals the inverse dynamics 
to the Habermasian notion of the colonization of the 'lifeworld' by the 'system'. 
The 'system' in Venezuela is experiencing critical transformations of yet unknown 
consequences. As a matter of fact, there are significant disputes among Chavistas 
as to whether the transformations should be of a reformist or revolutionary nature 
(Ellner, 2005), as both the national and international opposition to the regime 
organize powerful challenges to such changes. Paying attention to these dynamics 
not only can help us understand the unfolding of democracy and citizenship, 
reforms and revolutions; but also guide us toward more peaceful and just ends. 
It is still to be seen how the so-called third-wave democracies of Latin America 
are transformed by the present 'grand refuse'. It is still too early to tell whether 
the current street politics amount to more than a reaction to neo-liberal policies 
and disenchantment with previous national political regimes and parties, and 
can catalyse a vision for alternative socio-political projects. But as people take 
their collective grievances and hopes to the streets, political consciousness is 
transformed . As the Venezuelan political regime pressures for the advancement 
of post-neo-Iiberal policies and practices, the country becomes the referential crest 
of the tide that is potentially opening Latin America to a new era, raising hopeful 
expectations for many and profound fears for others. In this process, the limits of 
both the invited and invented arenas of citizenship are being continuously redrawn 
(Cornwall, 2002; Miraftab, 2004). Caraquenos and other Venezuelans have taken to 
the streets of their capital to both denounce the 'post-justice city' (Mitchell, 2001) 
and explore what the 'just city' and country can be (Fainstein, 2000). Caracas has 
thus become the 'contesting city' (Cantu Chapa, 2005) or 'insurgent city' (Holston 
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and Appadurai, 1999) par excel/ance in Latin America and as The New York Times 
puts it, the 'new Mecca for the left' (Forero, 2006). 
Cultural citizenship in Caracas has been collectively constructed and expanded 
since 1998 (Delanty, 2002). Citizenship has also been shaped through struggles for 
rights in the disputes over meanings and practices of participation, the distribution 
of resources, and boundary-setting between the public and the private, the social 
and the individual, and the modern and the traditional (Tamayo, 2004). The 
previously excluded and disenfranchised on the basis of race and class, and also 
sex, gender, religion, culture, and national origins have reclaimed their citizenship 
(Kearns, 1995; Miraftab, 1994). But though 'insurgent' (Holston, 1995), it does not 
necessarily amount to inclusive citizenship (Gaventa, 2002) . As these struggles, 
most of which have been played out as zero-sum games, progressed, others have 
voluntarily opted out of the current process hoping that their non-participation 
will delegitimize the Chavez government. 
Despite these challenges, inclusive citizenship in Caracas is being constructed 
as it is being actively performed, fully representing the dynamics of active 
and performative citizenship discussed by Kearns (1995), Miraftab (1994), and 
Boudreau (2000), respectively. Concretely, in the recent Venezuelan constitution, 
citizenship rights have been expanded for women, indigenous groups, and the 
dispossessed. A gap, however, remains between citizenship as defined by law and 
as it is enacted in everyday life, described as a 'performative paradox' (Lee, 1998). 
It is not widening because people challenge the law with their practices making it 
more inclusive, which is the most common case when a performative paradox is in 
place. Instead, the novelty of the current performative paradox in Venezuela is that 
it challenges individual and institutional practices - from all sides of the political 
spectrum - that do not live up to the expectations created by the new constitution 
and derived laws. The extraordinary, short-lived events in Caracas's public places 
continue to have a transformational effect in the city and the nation. These spaces 
of insurgent citizenship 'engage, in practice, the problematic nature of belonging 
to society' (Holston and Appadurai, 1999, p. 50), and explicitly challenge the post­
justice city as the inequitable result of an unchecked neo-liberalism. For many, 
they offer hope for the future of the just city, yet its realization is not a given. The 
difficult trajectory from raising political consciousness to effective political action 
on progressive policy remains to be traversed. The hurdles are both external, 
i.e., the national and international opposition to the regime, and internal, as the 
corruption, opportunism, ineptitude, and exclusionary politics of the IV Republic 
are not so easily surmounted in the V Republic. 
Two of Winocur's (2003) perspectives on citizenship transformation (Chapter 1) 
are relevant here. Firstly, citizens have rights to quality public space. Accordingly, 
minority and marginalized groups should have rights to use public space as a 
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strategy of visibility and survival. This has been accomplished in Caracas to a 
great extent by new practices of socia,l interaction and control, consumption and 
production of space. Arguably, a sense·of responsibilities associated with the use 
of the'commons' have not developed at the same pace as notions of rights of use, and 
thus problems of maintenance and preservation have in some cases worsened, 
The second perspective explores the impact of the media in transforming 
participation in the public sphere and in public spaces, which we have shown to 
be extensive. The disingenuous portrayal of demonstrations, marches, stoppages, 
strikes, riots, and exit polls have all lead to 'imagined communities' (Anderson, 
1983) and 'imagined geographies' (Gregory, 1994) in Venezuela. These are built 
on people believing that the city they inhabit is the one that is distortedly re­
presented to them through selected and edited media images and discourses. 
Conversely, the media has been cleverly and effectively used to secure and expand 
spaces and practices of insurgent citizenship. In effect, the hegemonic role of the 
media resulted in an informational 'grand refuse' as 'grass-roots' communication 
(mouth to mouth, computer to computer, and cell phone to cell phone) reversed 
the 2002 coup-d'etat. 
Thus, the challenge remains for further radicalization of democracy in Venezuela, 
This radicalization of democracy has progressed through the repeated legitimation 
of this regime through elections, the enactment of a new constitution and laws, 
and extending the rights to street politics for all Venezuelans. This, however, has 
been hindered by the aforementioned corruption, opportunism, ineptitude, and 
exclusionary politics on the part of the government and non-cooperation and 
outright sabotaging on the part of national and international opponent elites. To 
enable a state of full participation and deliberation, respect for both supporters 
and dissenters of the new political regime is necessary. 
Final Words 
In the complex and ongoing street politics in Caracas discussed in this chapter, 
there is a range of reterritorializing and deterritorializing processes at play. From 
the point of view of urban space, several points should be remembered. First, 
public spaces in Caracas have been the scenes for expressing, both peacefully and 
violently, a wide range of political stances both for and against the new regime. 
During the coup and its aftermath, public spaces were critical sites for both the 
enactment of discontent and the reformulation of citizenship through marching, 
chanting, rioting, graffiti, and other street acts, drawn from both traditional and 
more insurrectional tactics. Second, beyond the incidents taking place in real­
time / real-space, a critical, superposed dimension to the fatidic April 2002 events 
and its aftermath can be identified. It is constituted by the mismatch between 
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those real and variegated happenings occurring in different areas of metropolitan 
Caracas, and the virtual city presented simultaneously by the media through the 
manipulated construction and editing of partial truths. In an attempt to counter 
manipulated media information, public spaces have been disputed and occupied 
by the conflicting groups and used as expressions of solidarity and face-to-face 
communication among members of the same political affiliation. 
From the point of view of architecture, public buildings - seats of political 
and military power in Venezuela - on the one hand and private buildings 
- headquarters of the media, the oil company, and others in the opposition 
- on the other, functioned as symbolic icons of power around which the public 
has gathered. Significantly, both the metropolitan location of these buildings in 
Caracas and their accessibility from different parts of the city have been crucial. 
This study reveals that in Venezuela the challenge remains for political actors 
to find ways 'to h'ansform the existential struggle back into a dispute' (Garda­
Guadilla et ai., 2004, p. 20). On the one hand, the state has to regain legitimacy 
in the eyes of all Venezuelans and to establish bridges to all sectors to negotiate 
conflict through constitutional means. On the other hand, civil society should 
strive to define a common collective identity to relate to the state and recognize 
its mediating role. Urban spaces and buildings have become symbolically and 
practically imbricated with the ongoing conflicts, enabling social inequalities and 
polarization in the country to find their expression and contestation in the capital's 
urban space. Just as extraordinary events in Caracas's recent past have marked the 
current state of events in Venezuela, ordinary places can be catalysts for citizen 
awareness to manoeuvre from undemocratic existential struggles to a democratic 
and participatory political culture. In distinguishing between making life and 
making history (Flacks, 1988), we celebrate that people in Caracas have risen to 
the challenge of making history through extraordinary political mobilization in 
public space. We hope that they also seize this unique opportunity to refashion 
ordinary life into being democratic, inclusionary, and just. 
Notes 
1. 	 The literature on this is extensive. For syntheses, see Ellner and Hellinger (2004); 
McCaughan (2004). 
2. 	 Exceptional contributions in this area have been done by Garcia-Guadilla (1998; 2002; 
2003; 2004); Garcia-Guadilla et a/. (2004), L6pez Maya (1999, 2003), L6pez-Maya and 
Lander, (2004), Lander and L6pez-Maya (2005), Navarrete (2005). 
3. 	 According to the Oil and Gas Journal and Energy Information Administration, there w~re 
eight countries with greater annual oil production than Venezuela, but only five Wl~ 
greater proven reserves, all being in the Middle East (Appenzeller, 2004, pp. 90-91). ThIS 
underlines the strategic importance of Venezuela to the United States, which is by fa~ 
the greatest consumer of oil in the world, followed by China and Japan. 13 per cent 0 
US oil imports come from Venezuela (Ibid ., p. 89). 
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4. 	 This approximation belies the difficulty of defining the limits, density, and urban form 
of self-built squatter settlements which are estimated to house 60 per cent of Venezuela's 
population (Architectural League of New York, 2002). 
5. 	 The population of Caracas could be larger because figures tend to underestimate the 
barrio population because of the difficulties of access and of accounting for non-citizen 
residents. The most populous district, Libertador, had a population of 1.9 million in 2004. 
6. 	 This public housing project is composed of 70 buildings with a total of 9,176 apartments, 
and some community services (schools, markets, etc.). It is named to mark the outing of 
the last dictator Perez Jimenez in 1958. Originally planned for 60,000 inhabitants, today 
it is home to 76,000 people. Counting the self-built houses between buildings, the area's 
total population is in the hundreds of thousands. The area population is particularly 
politicized, and it is within walking distance of the Miraflores presidential palace. 
7. 	 These municipalities were created by the division of the old Sucre District in the 
mlmicipal reforms of 1989. 
8. 	 There are some important disparities in the statistics found for this period. In this 
quote, the percentage of poor are different from the figures given above. Additionally, 
the figure of 60 per cent middle class in 1982 more or less corresponds to the 'not poor' 
category in other accounts, but this category is not necessarily equivalent to 'middle 
class'. 
9. 	 All the maps were elaborated by Josefina Florez and Nelliana Viloria in 2000 with 
information updated for 1998. These maps were updated from originals from 1992, 
which formed part of. Josefina Florez's PhD dissertation'Accesibilidad, calidad urbana 
y grupos socioeconomic os en el patron de localizacion residencial' (Spain, 1992). The 
primary sources of information were: Income: stratification proposed by Datamilisis for 
socio-economic sectors from A to E, 1998. Average value of the US dollar: Banco Central 
de Venezuela. DenSity: OCEl projections for 1998. Land use: AKROS registries from 
January to December 1998, following a methodology by Rivas and Padr6n. Accessibility: 
Josefina Florez. 
10. It is important to bear in mind that Caracas is multinucleated, it has a rapid 
transportation system (the Metro), and the majority of people in poor areas do not own 
autos, all of which affects land values. 
11 . The constitution of 1811 marked the beginning of Venezuela 's I Republic, but since 
the Caracas criollo elite failed to rally popular support for the cause of independence, 
a raCially defined civil war marred the early years. In 1813, Sim6n Bolivar captured 
Caracas, where he was proclaimed 'The Liberator' establishing the U Republic. But 
by 1814, enemy troops forced Bolivar and his army out of Caracas, bringing an end 
to the II Republic. Although Caracas remained in royalist hands, the 1819 Congress at 
Angostura (present-day Ciudad Bolivar) established the m Republic with Bolivar as 
president. In 1821, Bolivar's troops finally liberated Caracas from Spanish rule. Nearly 
a century and a half of military rule ensued until 1959. This stark break with the past 
has been attributed to oil-based wealth, which gave government the material resources 
to win the population over to democracy, and to the spirit of cooperation among the 
nation's various political entities as embodied in the Pact of Punto Fijo. In another 1958 
pact, the 'Declaration of Principles and Governing Program', the main political parties 
(AD, COPEI, and the URD) agreed on a range of matters with respect to the economy, 
including the rights of association and collective bargaining, and state subsidies for the 
poor. The objective was to institutionalize a 'prolonged political truce' in favour of the 
democratic project. The 'Spirit of the 23rd of January' informed the 1961 constitution, 
w hich guaranteed a wide range of civil liberties, instituted a weak bicameral legislature, 
and strong executive powers. The major group excluded from the political pacts of 1958 
was the extreme left (Haggerty, 1993, np). 
12. 	 Owing to the discovery that the government had buried civilians in mass graves and 
not counted those deaths. 
13. 	 In the 1958 Pact of Punto Fijo, president Betancourt granted concessions to a broad range 
of political forces, but yet managed to maintain the hegemony of the main political 
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parties, especially AD and COPEl. Other groups were excluded from the political pacts, 
particularly the leftists (Haggerty, 1993, np). Chavistas conceived the Pact of Punto Fijo 
as an essential symbol of the IV Republic. 
14. 	 The new oil law 'limited foreign companies to 50 joint ventures and doubled the 
royalties to be paid to the state per barrel of extracted oil. It also for the first time 
imposed some accounting and fiscal transparency on the murky operations of PDVSA, 
and contained provisions allowing the government to restructure the petroleum 
industry in due course' (Wilpert, 2003a, p. 107). 
15. 	 See Wilpert (2003a); Vila Planes (2003); Camejo (2002); and Medina (2001) for a more 
detailed description of these reforms and their implications. 
16. 	 Chavez had claimed PDVSA's managers were committed to neo-Iiberal agendas which 
favoured foreign interests. Their status threatened, PDVSA's leading technocrats 
claimed they alone had the technical expertise necessary to run the company. In their 
defence, the space in front of the PDVSA building was renamed Meritocracy Plaza. 
17. 	 Rodriguez (2005, p. 191), who was attorney general (fiscal) at the time of the coup, 
gives the following names of the sharpshooters: Roberto Francisco McKnight, Roger 
de Jeslls Lugo Miquilena, Franklin Manuel Rodriguez, Jorge Hernan Meneses, Jesus 
Antonio Meneses, Nelson Enrique Rosales and John Carlos Garzon. 'This last person 
was Colombian, another one was from Panama, McKnight was from the US and Jesus 
Lugo Miquilena had a false Venezuelan ID' (our translation). Not all those killed were 
demonstrators, some local workers were caught in the fray too. 
18. 	 What the commercial television channels did not show was the street below the 
Llaguno Bridge, which was empty except for the Metropolitan Police. The manipulation 
of information is evident in the documentaries Puente Llaguno, Clave de una masacre 
(Palacios, 2004b) and The Revolution Will Not Be Televised (Bartley and O'Briain, 2003). 
Puente Llaguno obtained the first prize in the Latin American Documentary Festival 
2004, and the General Public award in Spain's Film Festival 2005. TI1e Revolution Will Not 
Be Televised has also won numerous international awards. 
19. 	 Given these circumstances, one of the most notable aspects of the organization of the 
demonstrations in favour of Chavez was the capacity to communicate by alternative 
means. This confirms the importance of face to face contacts in public spaces - locally 
called radio 'bemba' (popular term for mouth, referring to oral communication). 
20. 	 This is so considering that government supported TV and radio stations were closed 
down by coup sympathizers, and that commercial channels were showing only comics 
and feature films. The only information some Venezuelans had access to was that 
broadcast by international cable channels such as CNN. 
21. 	 The Metropolitan police played a major role, encouraged by the then Metropolitan Mayor 
Pena who supported the coup. By this time, however, large factions of the military 
forces had declared their loyalty to the Constitution and the democratically elected 
government, making systematic violence difficult to maintain or to justify. Meanwhile, 
an involvement of the US government in the coup had been claimed, and the US did 
publicly recognize Carmona's government. We could suppose that the US government 
dropped its official approval later because it would have been difficult to justify support 
for a regime that had adopted measures that seriously violated human rights. 
22. 	 An NGO of coup victims (ASOVIC) lists 19 people killed on 11 April, and 27 between 
the 12th and the 14th. 
23. 	 The Cuban Embassy was attacked because it symbolically represents the communist 
ideology many opponents of Chavez claim is embraced by his regime. . 
24. 	 The mayor of Baruta, Henrique Capriles Radonski, was charged in relation to hi,S 
participation in the violent Cuban Embassy siege in Caracas between 9 and 13 AprIl 
2002. The main evidence against him can be found in celebratory footage aired by 
commercial TV. See the documentary Asedio de una Embajada (Palacios, 2004a). 
25. 	 This plaza continues to symbolize opposition to the government and is al~ay~a 
reference in the spasmodic protests against the government, as happened durUlg e 
time of the gllarimbas. 
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26. 	 For instance, TV channels selectively showed streets in the anti-Chavista areas of the 
city where businesses were closed, denoting compliance with the stoppage. 
27. 	 This building is typical of the modern, fortress style public buildings of the IV Republic, 
which erected real and symbolic barriers between the public, especially the poor sectors, 
and the officials who were supposed to be serving them. 
28. 	 The 1999 Constitution provides for a recall of elected representatives after they have 
served half their term. It is claimed that the Venezuelan Constitution is the only one in 
the world that sanctions a presidential recall. 
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